Yubikey

YubiHSM


Passwords¹¹

Simon Josefsson

About Yubico

- Started in 2007 in Stockholm
- Founder and CEO is Stina Ehrensvärd
- Presence today in Sweden, UK and US
- Team of ~15 people
- Core invention is the YubiKey
- Online web shop and (in)direct sales
- Web shop sales to anyone \$25 per unit
- Free software friendly

8000 customers 80 countries

























YubiKey



YubiKey Quick Facts

- The YubiKey generates one-time passwords for identification and authentication
- Two factor, One Touch, Zero drivers!



- Unique AES key in every YubiKey
- YubiKey configuration is customizable














Typical Usage





IDENTITY

ONE TIME PASSWORD



ccccccehll
vjjitleikcffjndtjkgnrejudfrjncun
ccccccehll
crnhttrgbgikrcctihnlhclrvhkldcdj



DEMO

1.Insert YubiKey
2.Launch text editor
3.Touch YubiKey

```
Emacs: *scratch*
                                                                     File Edit Options Buffers Tools Lisp-Interaction Help
        ;; This buffer is for notes you don't want to save, and for Lisp evaluation.
;; If you want to create a file, visit that file with C-x C-f,
;; then enter the text in that file's own buffer.
ekhqjhbctrqnhntvqdukibufbiqcrjndknctqhibitcj
ekhqjhbctrgnrikkkuuuilenhnuuuluefkcltddcvrgd
ekhgjhbctrgngiltdihufjjllhdfdnhkdfgeujgfhjtv
-U:**-
       *scratch*
                    All (8,0)
                                  (Lisp Interaction Develock) -
```

ModHex

- USB keyboards returns scan codes, not characters! Keyboard layout matters...
- Modhex encoding is hex encoding with another alphabet
 - cbdefghijkInrtuv (modhex)
 - 0123456789abcdef (hex)
- For examplehex string 00 is cc in modhex
 - Modhex ekhgjhbctrgn is 39658610dc5b hex
- Goal with alphabet is keyboard layout independent character input

YubiKey OTP Format

- One YubiKey OTP consists of two parts:
 - Variable length 0-16 modhex characters for identity
 - 32 modhex characters with OTP data
- The two parts are concatenated:
 - ekhgjhbctrgnkutgvrvkinllgnkejtlgidhbubeuebdb
- Yubico ships 12 character identities
 - Splitting PASSWORDOTP concern
- Identity string is configurable

Encrypted OTP data

- Internal format of the encrypted OTP:
 - 6 byte: internal identity string
 - 2 byte: session counter (non-volatile)
 - 2 byte: 8Hz timestamp (low part)
 - 1 byte: 8Hz timestamp (high part)
 - 1 byte: session use (volatile)
 - 2 byte: non-predictable data "nonce"
 - 2 byte: CRC-16 of all fields with this field 0
- Final OTP is AES-ECB encrypted plaintext

Counters and time

- The YubiKey OTP has two monotonously incrementing counters:
 - One that is stored in long-term memory: incremented by one on first use after each powerup
 - One in volatile memory: incremented by one on every use during a powerup-cycle
- The YubiKey OTP contains time information:
 - However it is not wall-clock time but instead time since last power-up (because there is no battery)
 - Requires two OTPs from the same powerup-cycle to detect time-delaying phishing

Static password

- Static password mode
 - Generate the same strong password on every YubiKey touch
- Vulnerable to keyloggers!
- Can provide some security advantages compared to human-recalled passwords
- Useful when evaluating user-acceptance of YubiKey – no server-side changes

OATH HOTP

- Open AuTHentication
 - http://www.openauthentication.org/
- HMAC-based One-Time Password (HOTP)
 - RFC 4226. Code is 6-8 digits, e.g. "673821"
- Enables one-time-password systems with tokens from multiple vendors
- The YubiKey can be programmed to generate OATH HOTP codes
 - Version 2.x only since December 2009

Challenge Response


- Combined with client-software the YubiKey supports challenge-response
- Algorithm is HMAC-SHA1
- The YubiKey can sign data authorized by user by touch
- Use-case is software license management, improved security, pay-TV boxes etc
- YubiKey version 2.2 and later only

RFID YubiKey

- YubiKey combined with RFID chip
- Provides security in both digital and physical world



Automated Logistics







Yubico Provides

- YubiKey different variants
- Personalization software
- Low-level OTP parsing libraries
- Validation protocol specification
- Clients to validation server
- Online Validation server
- Hosted demo servers

Yubico Provides (contd)

- Yubico Forum for support
 - http://forum.yubico.com/
- Yubico Wiki for knowledge
 - http://wiki.yubico.com/
- PAM module
 - Documentation describing how FreeRadius is used to provide a Radius server
- OpenID server http://openid.yubico.com/
- YubiKey plugin to simpleSAMLphp

Personalization Software

- http://yubico.com/developers/personalization/
- Alternatives:
 - 1. Windows Personalization Tool
 - 2. Windows COM/ActiveX component
 - 3. Free software portable library + tool
 - C code, BSD license packaged by Debian etc
 - http://code.google.com/p/yubikey-personalization/
 - 4. Third-party Mac graphical interface

Lock code

- YubiKeys can be protected with a lock code
- Prevents unauthorized re-programming of the YubiKey
- The AES key can never be read out from the device
- Recommendation: If you personalize YubiKeys yourself, set a random locking code on each device

Low-level OTP parsing

- http://code.google.com/p/yubico-c/
- Core library written in C
- BSD license included in Debian, Fedora etc
- Functionality ported to Java, PHP, Perl, Python, ...
- Low-level, example interfaces:

DEMO

1.Reprogram a YubiKey with 'ykpersonalize' 2.Debug generated OTP using 'ykdebug'

```
5_
                        jas@mocca: ~
File Edit View Terminal Help
Firmware version 1.3.5 Touch level 6608 Program sequence 3
Configuration data to be written to key configuration 1:
fixed: m:cccccccccc
uid: h:0000000000000
acc code: h:0000000000000
ticket flags: APPEND CR
config flags:
Commit? (y/n) [n]: y
dtuinfvllbiirtbcdf
warning: overlong token, ignoring prefix: ccccccccccc
Input:
 token: ilgucgnleilkckdtujnfvllbjirtbcdf
       7a 5e 05 ba 37 a9 09 2d e8 b4 fa a1 87 cd 10 24
 Output:
       00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 35 c3 c3 00 83 ef 70 0a
Struct:
 uid: 00 00 00 00 00 00
 counter: 1 (0x0001)
 timestamp (low): 49973 (0xc335)
 timestamp (high): 195 (0xc3)
 session use: 0 (0x00)
 random: 61315 (0xef83)
 crc: 2672 (0x0a70)
Derived:
 cleaned counter: 1 (0x0001)
 modhex uid: cccccccccc
 triggered by caps lock: no
 crc: F0B8
 crc check: ok
jas@mocca:~$
```

Validation Server Protocol


- Protocol specification online:
 - http://yubico.com/developers/api/
- Concept of client identity
- Optional HMAC signing of requests/response
- Simple Query and response (v1):
 - http://api.yubico.com/wsapi/verify?id=42&otp=vvvvvvcurikvhjcvnlnbecbkubjvuittbifhndhn
 - h=hhbVQZYvkEWUdhYjx1hjB/yeW/Y= t=2008-01-11T03:51:21Z0079 status=OK

Client ID & Key

- Generate your own client identity & HMAC key online:
 - http://yubico.com/developers/api/
- You will be allocated one integer and a newly generated random base64 string
- Used by client software to sign requests and validate responses

DEMO

1.Validate OTP against online demo 2.Verify an OTP against Yubico Validation Server using command line tools



```
5_
                                jas@mocca: ~
File Edit View Terminal Help
jas@mocca:~$ wget -q -O - 'https://api.yubico.com/wsapi/verify?id=1&otp=ekhgjhbc△
tranvvkftttuhlhrkibeutukkakadhibljhr'
h=WsK3+VXb9vU/KVnnv7xV4Wd1fsA=
t=2010-04-19T09:32:27Z0185
status=0K
jas@mocca:~$ wget -g -O - 'https://api.vubico.com/wsapi/verify?id=1&otp=ekhgjhbc
trgnvvkftttuhlhrkibeutukkgkgdhibljhr'
h=nFjt9rtSyseUFRXosXtgk1K/Vjw=
t=2010-04-19T09:32:32Z0165
status=REPLAYED OTP
jas@mocca:~$ wget -q -O - 'https://api.yubico.com/wsapi/verify?id=1&otp=ekhqjhbc
tranvvkftttuhlhrkibeutukkakadhibljhr'
h=UGPNBDMAMfv0JQCqjh1z6MlLMAM=
t=2010-04-19T09:32:33Z0765
status=REPLAYED OTP
jas@mocca:~$
```

Validation Protocol v2.0

- Supports distributed servers
- Each client query in parallel all servers
- Servers all talk to each other
- Clients waits for positive validation
- While waiting, will reject OTP if any negative response is received
- Some servers may respond "replayed request" if they became aware of the query through another validation server first

Validation server clients


- C library, PHP module, many others...
- PHP code easy to install and use
 - wget http://php-yubico.googlecode.com/files/Auth_Yubico-1.9.tgz pear install Auth Yubico-1.9.tgz

```
<?php
require_once 'Auth/Yubico.php';
$otp = "ccbbddeertkrctjkkcglfndnlihhnvekchkcctif";

# Generate a new id+key from https://api.yubico.com/get-api-key/
$yubi = &new Auth_Yubico('42', 'F00BAR=');
$auth = $yubi->verify($otp);
if (PEAR::isError($auth)) {
   print "Authentication failed: " . $auth->getMessage();
   print "Debug output from server: " . $yubi->getLastResponse();
} else {
   print "You are authenticated!";
}
?>
```


Validation Server


- YK-VAL: YubiKey Validation server
 - Free software http://code.google.com/p/yubikey-ksm/
 - YK-VAL responsible for verifying YubiKey OTPs following Yubico's web service API protocol
 - YK-VAL requests AES decryption from YK-KSM
- YK-KSM: YubiKey Key Storage Module
 - Free software http://code.google.com/p/yubikey-val-server-php/
 - YK-KSM responsible for storing AES keys and decrypting incoming OTP



Scalability

- Internal redundancy: YK-VAL is configured to query any number of YK-KSM machines and will use the first valid answer
- The YK-KSM can be cloned easily:
 - No synchronization of data necessary beyond loading of AES keys
- The YK-VAL can be replicated
 - Requires loose synchronization of OTP counter fields between YK-VAL instances





Windows Local login, Remote Desktop login

Basic YubiKey enabled RADIUS authentication service

Proof of concept implementation of YubiKey enabled RADIUS Server

Open SSO authentication server

CMS & editing

OTP, YubiKey ID

OTP

OTP

OTP

Licensed software

Free open software

Free open software

Free open software

Europe, Global

Global

Global

Global

Organization	Product Description	Authentication Mode	Business Model	Region
Crasman &	Crasmanager CMS		Licensed software	Finland, Global
Drupal 🗗	CMS software	ОТР	Free open software	Global

Done

Rohos r₽

YubiRadius 🚱

RADIUS_on_Premise @

Sun 🚱

PAM


- Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM)
- User authentication and authorization under GNU/Linux & Solaris
- Used in other environments to achieve modularity, e.g., Radius
- Challenge-Response approach
 - http://code.google.com/p/yubico-pam/
 - C code, BSD/GPL, Debian packages
- Useful for SSH and Desktop login

OpenID

- Decentralized web-based authentication system
- Serious phishing security issues!
 - One-time passwords are cost effective solution
 - SMS passcodes, X.509 https other approaches
- Three parties:
 - 1.Identity Provider (IdP)
 - 2.Relying Partner (RP)
 - 3.User identified by an OpenID URL

Yubico OpenID server

- Based on JanRain's OpenID library and their example OpenID Server
- Minimally modified to support YubiKey
- http://code.google.com/p/yubico-openid-server/
- Running on http://openid.yubico.com/ as free service – all existing YubiKeys have an OpenID URL automatically
- Easy to use with your own URL, just add two HEAD META tags to your HTML page
- No vendor lock-in!



SAML

- Security Assertion Markup Language
- Format to exchange authentication and authorization information between security domains
- Specified by OASIS: www.oasis-open.org
- Primary use case is web browser sign on but protocol is transport agnostic

Yubico SAML Server

- simpleSAMLphp (SSP) PHP based SAML server with YubiKey plugin
- Sun/Oracle's OpenSSO server with YubiKey plugin
- Both are free software, commercial alternatives exists
- YubiKey hosts SSP as http://saml.yubico.com/
- Free service for all YubiKey owners

YubiHSM



YubiHSM Quick Facts

- Currently in beta testing with customers
- Small USB device (0.2W) acting like a serial device – GNU/MAC/Windows-friendly
- Priced at \$500 with no maintenance fee
- AES encrypt/decrypt/decrypt-compare using key in YubiHSM
- HMAC-SHA1 with key in YubiHSM (HOTP/TOTP)
- AES-based NIST SP800-90 CTR-DRBG random number generator

More facts

- Holds 40 AES/HMAC keys indexed by a 32-bit key handle
- Fairly small set of interface functions
 - YSM_NULL, YSM_SYSTEM_INFO_QUERY, YSM_ECHO, YSM_KEY_STORAGE_UNLOCK, YSM_BUFFER_LOAD, YSM_BUFFER_RANDOM_LOAD, YSM_NONCE_GET, YSM_AEAD_GENERATE, YSM_RANDOM_AEAD_GENERATE, YSM_BUFFER_AEAD_GENERATE, YSM_AEAD_DECRYPT_CMP, YSM_AEAD_YUBIKEY_OTP_DECODE, YSM_DB_YUBIKEY_AEAD_STORE, YSM_DB_YUBIKEY_OTP_VALIDATE, YSM_TEMP_KEY_LOAD, YSM_AES_ECB_BLOCK_ENCRYPT, YSM_AES_ECB_BLOCK_DECRYPT, YSM_AES_ECB_BLOCK_DECRYPT_CMP, YSM_HMAC_SHA1_GENERATE, YSM_RANDOM_GENERATE, YSM_RANDOM_RESEED
- Reference Python code available on GitHub
 - Third-party java code being published
- Documented interface, please write your own!

Background

- Yubico operates validation server for a fleet of YubiKey's
- We needed to secure millions of AES keys stored on servers world-wide
- Traditional HSMs are expensive, cannot store millions of keys and only offer encrypt/decrypt interfaces
 - Attackers getting root would get our AES keys!
- We needed an inexpensive solution and interfaces for native YubiKey OTP parsing and decrypt-and-compare

Wider usage

- Threat model: someone roots your server
 - Physical attacks (stealing the machine) is outside of our threat model – we use the traditional security industry to mitigate that.
- Goal: Minimize what the attacker can achieve by becoming root
- How #1: Make the data stored on the server useless to an attacker

YubiHSM Indirect Mode

- Based on AES CCM RFC 3610
 - Early AEAD cipher mode, easy to implement
- Enables support of millions of "virtual" keys protected by YubiHSM
- Used here to do "key wrap", i.e., encrypt an AES key or a (hashed) password
- Encrypted AEAD-blob stored on server
- On request, YubiHSM takes the AEADprotected key and either an OTP or (hashed) password for comparison

Validating a password

- Let's say you are building a server to validate passwords for millions of users
- Perform a PBKDF2 iterated hash as early as possible, using a per-user salt/count
- Query a server with a YubiHSM with input (AEAD-blob, potential-PBKDF2)
- Server uses AEAD_DECRYPT_CMP and returns yes/no
- No data stored on server is useful for the attacker!

Caveats

- Key management of the YubiHSM keys becomes critical
- Authorization of AEAD generation and storage is important
- Best practice is to generate a random key with the same key handle and configure two YubiHSMs in pair at the same time on trusted machine
- One YubiHSM will have permissions to generate AEADs (the set-password machine) and another to validate passwords using the AEADs (the validate-password machine)

Thank you for listening!

Questions?

